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Hastings Center Report, January-February 1997

Making Sausage
The Ninth Circuit's Opinion
by Carl E. Schneider

s I write, the Supreme
Court has just agreed to
hear Compassion in Dying
v. Washington and Q}tiU u
Vacco, the two cases in which United
States circuit courts of appeals held
that a state may not constitutionally
prohibit physicians from helping a
terminally ill person who wishes to
commit suicide to do so. These cases
have already received lavish comment
and criticism, and no doubt the Supreme Court's opinion will garner
even more. Reasonably enough, most
of this analysis addresses the merits
of physician-assisted suicide as social
policy. I, here, want to talk about how
setting bioethical policy through constitutional adjudication actually works
and how its usefulness is diminshed
by some practical deficiencies.
Courts are often thought wellequipped to resolve social issues because they are guided by the thought
and wisdom that animated the Constitution. Sometimes this argument
has some truth. But bioethical questions are generally resolved under a
provision (the Fourteenth Amendment) that says only that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."
These words, noble though they are,
give courts little insight and little direction. The Supreme Court has been
able to fmd in them such a suspiciously wide range of lessons--from
the unconstitutionality of statutes limiting a woman's right to an abortion
to the unconstitutionality of statutes
limiting the hours an employee can
be required to work-that one may

begin to wonder just what the justices
have been consulting.
The vagueness of the Fourteenth
Amendment throws judges back on
their own resources. Because judges
vary in experience and talent, these
resources vary. But all judges are lawyers. A lawyer's training is centrally
about analyzing legal documents, particularly judicial opinions. It does little, for example, to equip lawyers to
understand and respect empirical evidence about social behavior and does
too much to convince them that the
best evidence about how the world
works is the particular facts of a litigated case. The practice of law may
remedy some of these ills, but today
most sophisticated legal practice is too
specialized to expose lawyers broadly
to social issues. Yet once appointed,
judges must become the broadest
kinds of generalists. In short, judges
are lawyers who-narrowly trained
and narrowly experienced-are unlikely to come to the extraordinary
range of problems they face with expertise or understanding.
What is worse, judges are less well
situated to learn about these problems than one might expect True,
the trial-court judge presides over
proceedings in which evidence is introduced. But a systematic flaw of
constitutional adjudication is that it
promulgates grand principles on the
basis of a single case's facts. Courts
tend to assume that the case before
them typifies the social problem at issue and that the parties before them
represent all relevant points of view.
And since the parties, not the judge,

decide what evidence will be intr~
duced, the judge does not hear what
will not benefit the parties, and the
quality of the information intr~
duced crucially depends on the wit
and learning of the attorneys the
Quinlans or the Cruzans happen to
hire and of the too often modestly
gifted political appointees and civil
servants who represent state governments. To be sure, interested groups
may file "friend of the court" briefs.
But in my experience, appellate judges
(at least) rarely read them.
Suppose, though, that this haphazard process leaves the federal trial
judge well informed. That judge's decision will only affect the people
within that judge's district If several
states are to be reached, the case must
be presented to a circuit court of appeals. If the whole country is to be
reached, the case must be taken to the
Supreme Court. Ironically, though, as
the case's reach widens, the judge's
contact with the evidence shrinks.
The parties normally reprint only a
few significant documents from the
trial record for the appellate judges.
And those judges typically do not
read even these excerpts, much less
ask to see the whole record. Rather,
they read the parties' briefs and listen
to their oral arguments. In the Supreme Court, briefs are limited to fifty
pages and oral arguments to thirty
minutes.
Moreover, judges have little time to
educate themselves, to reflect on a
case, or to write an opinion. The
courts of appeals are often egregiously far behind in their work. The
Supreme Court takes only a limited
number of cases each year (in addition to reviewing more than 5,000 requests to hear cases), but the Court
limits its docket to the most perplexing and controversial statutory and
constitutional cases that arise each
year, and mastering them during the
Court's nine-month term is, to say the
least, challenging.
To help them with this work, Supreme Court justices now commonly
hire several clerks, most of whom
graduated from law school a year previously. In the chambers of the justice
for whom I clerked, the burden of the
Court's work meant that cases were
handled like this: The justice would
read the parties' briefs in each case;
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the three clerks divided the cases
among them. Before oral argument,
the clerks and the justice would discuss the cases. The justice would listen
to the oral arguments, and the Court
would deliberate and vote privately. If
my justice was assigned to write an
opinion, the clerk who had worked
on the case would draft it. He had
ten days in which to do so. In that
time, he continued to read briefs and
to write memoranda to the justice on
the petitions to hear cases that kept
pouring into the Court. When the
clerk was finished drafting the opinion, the justice would read it over and
edit it lightly.
I admired the lawyerly skills of the
justice for whom I clerked. (I had less
admiration for my own skills, one year
out of law school.) But I think the
practical deficiencies of making social
policy through constitutional adjudication-the inexperience judges bring
to a case, the improverished opportunities they have for examining the
case's social landscape, and the time
pressures which harass them-are severe and offer the most charitable explanation for the regrettable quality
of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Com-

passion in Dying.
For example, the court in that case
appears to have known little about
medical decisions at the end of life.
The court (perhaps influenced by the
stories of the three plaintiffs who were
patients) creates the impression that
hospitals are awash in terminally ill
patients driven to commit suicide by
unendurable pain. It offers no indication of the numbers at stake, and
growing evidence raises doubt that
pain is the principal motivation of
those requesting assisted suicide. The
court "believe[d] that most, if not all,
doctors would not assist a terminally
ill patient to hasten his death as long
as there were any reasonable chance
of alleviating the patient's suffering or
enabling him to live under tolerable
conditions." Yet it has long been clear
and has recently become clearer
(through the SUPPORT study) that
many doctors undertreat pain. The
court "also believe[d] that physicians
would not assist a patient to end his
life if there were any significant doubt
about the patient's true wishes." Yet
the history of bioethics is in no small
part a reaction to the sobering number

of doctors who have not been driven
to understand patients' wishes, who
have not understood them, and who
have ignored them even when they
have understood them. The court dismisses out of hand the difficulty of
defining "terminal," and seems innocent of any awareness of how hard it
can be to apply any such definition.
The court's easy equation of withdrawing treatment and assisted suicide, and its peremptory rejection of
the principle of double effect, may
likewise be due to the court's need to
make decisions with dangerously little
learning, for the court gives scant
sense of understanding the long and
thoughtful ethical debate over these
subjects. The court's refusal to consider how far its reasoning carries beyond its ruling may have similar roots.
The court explains that refusal by saying that its task is to "decide only the
issue before us." If this is true, it is
another defect of constitutional adjudication as an instrument of social
policy, for what could be more perverse in an area so pervaded by slippery-slope problems than to prevent
policymakers from considering where
their decisions might lead?
The court might have had to grapple more seriously with its arguments
had it been responsible for writing
rules to govern its new regime of suicide. But the court loftily confmed itself to general principles and airily
dismissed the regulatory difficulties of
that regime: ''we believe that sufficient safeguards can and will be developed by the state and medical profession . . . to ensure that the possibility of error will ordinarily be remote." In light of the twenty-year
struggle states have had with courts
over regulating abortions, the Ninth
Circuit's complacency is hard to account for (particularly since the court
repeatedly and proudly cites the Supreme Court's latest major abortion
decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey).
Finally, the deficiencies of constitutional policymaking may help explain
the Ninth Circuit's astonishing confidence. Thus the court blandly announced that the Supreme Court's
opinions in "Planned Parenthood v.
Casey ... and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health . . . are fully
persuasive, and leave little doubt as to
the proper result."

One virtue of resolving social disputes judicially is supposed to be that
judges are detached, disinterested,
dispassionate observers who bring
cool judgment to over-heated questions. But as judges become the tribunes of the people, they may be hardpressed to sustain that moderation
and calm. Judge Reinhardt's opinion,
for instance, is disfigured by his contempt for those who have affronted
him with their disagreement. He
characterizes their arguments as "disingenuous," "meretricious," "ludicrous," "nihilistic," and "inflammatory." He then piously concludes by
hoping "that whatever debate may
accompany the future exploration of
the issues we have touched on today
will be conducted in an objective, rational, and constructive manner that
will increase, not diminish, respect for
the Constitution."
It is said that law and sausages are
two things one should never see being made. I have tried to show why
the practical deficiencies of constitutional adjudication make it a clumsy
tool for formulating bioethical policy
and why those deficiencies may help
explain a painfully unsatisfying opinion. But is not all law-making just as
unappetizing? I have several responses.
First, my purpose here has been to
correct a common over-estimate of
the purity of the judicial process. Second, I believe that the full battery of
policymaking institutions--appointed
commissions, administrative regulations, legislative hearings and debates,
common-law adjudication, and referenda-together work better than constitutional policymaking. These processes are better situated to assemble
and analyze information and to develop acceptable programs. And, unlike constitutional policymaking,
none of these processes is effectively
fmal. Most of all, these processes are
more consonant with democratic government. In recent decades, we have
been reconsidering our ideas about
death as the legal rules concerning
abortion, brain death, and terminating treatment have changed. Assisted suicide is a serious step in this
necessarily troubling process. It is a
question too important to cede to
courts.
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